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T H E  E L E C T O R A T E  AS A MARKET. 
. Much of the recent research on the spatial nature of 
party competition can be tracedto the work of Hotelling 
(1929), who was concerned with the question of why 
twocompeting businesses are often in adjacent positions. 
near the center of a spatial market. Kresge 's and Woolworth's 
are not at opposite ends of Main Street, but rather are next 
door to each other. 
Hotelling assumed that (1). there is a linear market 
bounded at both ends, (2) buyers of a commodity are "uniformly 
distributed" along the market, (3) the buyers' demand is 
0 
constant, 4 consumers buy from whoever is closer 
(a rational calculation), and (5)  :each competitor will attempt 
to fix his price8 and location so as to maximi'ze his profits 
(another rational calculation) He showed that competing r. 
firms converge toward adjacent Ijositions in the middle of 
the market, in the interest of increasing their share of 
that market. I 
Hotelling argued that by analogy, one could think of' 
voters as consumers and politicai parties as firms. Like . 
. . 
.Kresgets and Woolworth's the Democrats and ~epubiicans were 
in adjacent market positions,' close to the center of the , .  . 
' .  
liberalism-conservatism spectrum, where.the masses of voters 
were assumed to be. 
smithies (1941) amended Hotelling's assumption of in- 
elastic demand. He suggested that demand is. at least in part 
a function of price, and price in turn depends in part on 
transportation costs. Since price increases with rising 
transportation costs, firms are not only under pressure to 
move toward the center of the'market, but also under pressure 
. '. 
to retain peripheral support. If a firm is too near the. 
center, transportation costs to the hinterland ris.e, increas- 
ing cost and decreasing demand. In the electoral market., 
. . if both the major parties occupy.centra1 areas, voters in 
the "hinterlands" of the liberalism-conservatism spectrum' 
. . 
will not pay the price of travelling the. ideological.distance. : 
between their own positions and the positions of the parties.. .' -....-., . . 
. . .-'.-"..+? , . . .  ! . - . , . .  . 
Rather, they will stay away from the polls. : T& m g & c a  ; .  . ~ , .  
of the' parties from one another in order .to .attract and main- . . 
. . 
. ' 
tain hinterland support, then, partly accounts for the bimodal . . 
. . . . 
characteristic of the party' system that is..absent. from~tIotelling's . . 
. . 
. - . . 
model. , ;  
Elements of both Hotelling's and Smithies' models of 
the market are found in Downs' (1957) Economic Theory of 
Democracy. .Downs sugg.ests. that when the- bulk of ' the electorate 
. I .  . 
is located at the extremes of the dimension of political affect, 
the parties themselves will bifurcate ideologically. .Where 
the distribution of political affect is normal, however, and 
'therefore densest at the middle of the scale,.there will be 
ideological convergence of political .parties. 
Stokes ' (1966) has suggested that most. spatial interprets- a 
. . 
.tions of party competition have a "very poor fit with the 
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'Hotelling, Smithies and Downs all assume the relevance of 
. L , . 
the'.l'e£t-right dimension, and ' ~ a  Ponce's (1970) success . . .  
ii.using this concept with college samples suggests that . ' 
. u . . .  
it is indeed meaningful, at least to educated subgroups.. .. 
. . 
Moreover, Rice1 s (1928 : 275) earlier research suggests that , 
forteducated populations the distribution of this dimension 
may indeed be bell-shaped. We shall therefore focus ,on this 
cdnstruct in .our own research. 
One critical area in which we differ with previous 
researchers is in our rejection of their assumption that 
the electoral market is unidimensional. -Rather, we suggest, . . 
. . 
that these researchers are looking at only one of several 
bases of electoral choice, :the remaining factors being,le£t . . 
unidentified. In. this particular study, we are concerned . 
with how' people relate to the two major American political . 
.. . 
parties, specifically with, the extent to which people see 
themselves as more liberal than, or more conservative -than-, 
. . 
these'parties. Linked, with this concern 1s our interest in 
. . 
how individual positions 'and strength of party support c0.r- 
relate. From these data on individual perspectives, we shall 
be able to draw inferences regarding (a) the appropriate'stra-. 
tegies 'for political parties to optimize their positions. in 
the electoral market, and (b) the degree to which there is 
consensus on the relative ideological positions of the parties. 
In adopting this approach, we are attending to the criticisms 
raised by Stokes (1966) and by Buckianan. and Tullock. (1965) 
regarding the assumption of unidimensionality. 
A TWO MARKET MODEL. 
. . We also .differ from the Hotelling-Smithies-Downs 
-.formulation in thatwe reject the common.frame of refer- 
.ence of parties and'electorate that they assume. Their 
formulation suggests that all members of the electorate 
.:;are potential supporters of either of two major political 
:parties. Each voter knows' hi2 own utilities and chooses 
. ,'the party that maximizes his gain.s, reasoning that the 
, , profits accruing from his choice exceed the costs inherent 
. . 
..in this choice: Indeed, this notion-appears in more recent 
formulations as well'.(cf. Buchanan..and ~ullock, 1965; ~hubik, . . 
. . .  
Research in the, field of political socialization, however, 
suggests that political party choice is most generally trans- 
mitted from parent to child, and. that the child'. develops. an' 
affective attachment to his parents' party as a political 
object (Langton, 1969:53). ~ e s s  and Torney (1968.:97) report 
. . 
that as children age, they believe less and less in family 
. . 
loyalty as an appropriate basis for deciding which party. 
to support. However, even these .authors concede that where 
the parents both agree on party choice, their children will 
follow their lead 75 per cent of .the time. 'what makes this 
figure more remarkable is that family loyalty persists 9s a 
factor of central importance in the face of ideological dif- . . 
ferences between generations. What seems to happen is that 
the child, having developed an a.f fectiv.e attachment to a party 
as' a.politica1 object, then derives from contemporary poli- 
tical events a series of justifications for his party choice 
(cf. Hyman, 1959:74).. He therefore agrees.with his parents' 
: choice of political party, but has.different specific reasons 
for that choice than they do. . . 
The rarity of major political realignments ' in the 
, American electorate attests to the strength of the ties . . 
, . 
betweenvoters and their parties. While there is some 
ticket-splitting, and partisans of one persuasion sometimes 
vote-for candidates of the other, one does not frequently 
find :large numbers of voters severing their emotional links 
to one.party, and establishing links with another.. When 
such realignments do take place, moreover, they seem to 
occur over an extended period of time (Sellers, 1965). It 
appears to be easier for a Democrat to become a non-~emocrat 
than for him to become a ~epublican. Thus, during.realignment 
phases, third-party movements seem to play an important role 
as "half-way houses," giving ex-partisans of one'major per-,. 
suasion a political object on which to roost while getting, 
accustomed to the idea of supporting the party that in the.ir 
youth .was defined as the opposition .(MacRae and Neldrum, 1960 ; 
Alford, 1963:287-308). 
Given the emotional ties that exist between voters and 
parties, elections tend not to be won on the basis of one 
party attracting supporters of the opposite persuasion to 
its cause (Segal, 1968). Rather, the electoral task of each 
party'is to get its own partisans to the polls, and to maximize 
-7- 
its attractiveness to uncommitted or independent voters. 
. . 
Thus the parties operate in imperfect markets, in which ! 
. .!% 
* .  
significant blocs of consumers, on grounds that are largely i-. . 
> - 
emotional, will not buy their product regardless of what . . . 
they do. In the current American electorate, the Democrats 
have a plurality, but due largely to socioeconomic differences, 
Republican voters are.more likely to go to the polls. In our 
political system, the role of the independent becomes crucial. 
I 
THE MARKET POSITION OF INDEPENDENTS. 
; In Hotelling's model of a linear market, political in- 
dependents are assumed to occupy a "zone of indifference" 
/ 
within which it is unimportant whether .one votes Democratic 
or Republican since the costs are identical. In most .studies 
of American political behavior, similarly, the independents 
are conceived as occupying the center of the spectrum of poli- 
tical affect. 
This latter conceptualization is in large part a product 
of the particular questions and coding schemes used by academic 
survey organizations in the collection of partisanship data. 
The University of Michigan Survey Research Center, for:example, 
asks respondents in its political behavior samples: "Do.you 
consider yourself a Democrat, a Republican, or what?" People 
who claim identification with either the Democratic or ~epubli- 
can parties are then asked: "Do you consider yourself a strong . .  
I (Democrat/Republican) or not a very strong (Democrat/Republican?" 
, . 
Individuals who declare themselves at the outset to be ind~pend- 
ent are asked whether they generally favor the Democratic or 
Republican party. Data collected by this series of questions 
are coded to produce a one-digit index of party choice, 
depicted in Figure 1: The hypothetical distribution of this 
. index reflects both the Democratic plurality in the .American 
electorate, and the relatively small proportion of Americans 
who -regard themselves as political independents. While few 
researchers assume that this'index represents an interval 
scale, the. quality of ordinality has frequently been'attri- 
buted to it. Thus, party choice ,is,conceived of as a dimen- 
sionbounded at the poles'by the strong partisan positions. --
In terms of the Hotell . ing-Smithies-Downs model, we . 
would expect the parties to diverge ideologically if 
the distribution of political affect approximated the ' . -  
. . 
bimodal shape suggested in Figure 1. Yet the ideological ' 
similarity of the two major American political parties 
is more often noted than are any differences between them. 
Campbell and Valen (1966), for exainple, on the basis of 
a comparative study of the United States and ~ o r w a ~ ,  point 
out that 40 per cent of their American sample thought that 
the two major parties were about the same, and an additional 
8 per cent of the- sample .did not know .if there were differences 
between the parties.   he -corresponding figures' for 'the 
Norwegian sample were 11 per cent and 8 per cent. . . 
If the distance between the parties is not great, then 
the distance between Democratic and Republican partisans is 
not great either. We suggest that in fact the distribution 
of political affect 'is denser toward its center than.is . . 
the case in Figure 1. We contend that a significant propor- 
. . 
tion of the independents &d weak partisans occupy politi-' 
cal positions 'more extreme than the Democratic or Republican 
parties, i .e. , to the left of the Democrats or to the right 
of the ~e~ublicans. ~hus, -the parties must converge ideolo- 
gically to maintain the support of their.own partisans -if 
indeed their partisans are .at the center,of 'the distribution. .. 
At the same time, they must diverge to appeal to independents . '  
who might, on the left, dohsider voting for the New politics 
Party as an alternative to.the Democrats, or on the right 
might consider voting for the A.I.P. or even joining the 
Minutemen rather than participating in electoral politics 
. . at all ' (cf. Garvey, ,1966) . 
DATA. . . 
' .  
The Sample 
These concerns here explored using data collected by 
. . 
the Detroit Area Survey, University of ~ichigan, during 
the Spring and Summer of 1969'. A multi-stage probability 
sample of dwelling units in that part-of the Detroit SMSA 
that was tracted in 1950, plus some small additions made 
to include recent suburban population growth,since 1950 
was drawn to represent.dwel1ing units containing at least 
. . 
one white person (household head or spouse) 69 years of age 
or under. When only the household head was present, he 
or she was interviewed.' When both the head and spouse were 
present, one was randomly selected'for the interview. The 
final. sample contained 640 inteviews, representing 76 per 
cent of the eligible households sampled. Sixteen per cent 
of the households refused interviews, and 8 per cent were 
not 'completed because the respondent was not found at home . -  
or for other reasons. 
Interview Items 
Positions in the electoral marketplace were measured 
by 5 questions: 3 to define the respondent in terms of 
his party choice, and. 2 to define him in terms of liberal- 
ism-conservatism; 
Respondentswere first asked: "Generally speaking, 
do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a . . 
Democrat, or what?". Those who identified themselves as 
Democrats or Republicans were asked: ' "Do you consider 
yourself a strong (Democrat/Republican) or not a very 
strong (Democrat/Republican)?". Those who did not express 
a party preference were asked, "Do you generally lean more 
: .  
. toward the Republican or Democratic Party?' 
. . All respondents were then asked: "Do you think your 
. . 
own views are more. liberal' or more conservative than those 
. . 
of,the Democratic Party generally, or would.you say that . . 
you're not .sure?" and "How about the Republicans? Do 
you think your own views are generally more liberal or 
more conservative than those of the Republican Party, 
or would you say you're not sure?" 
RESULTS. 
Marginal Dist.ributions 
The plurality of our sample ( '44.6 per cent) identified 
themselves as Democrats. Only 22.4 per cent called'them- 
selves ~e~ublic'ans, while 31.1 per cent identified themselves 
as independents. Finally, only 2 per cent of the sample failed 
to answer the partisanship question. 
The preponderance of Democrats in the sample is not 
surprising, given the role that labor unions play'in 
Detroit politics. The proportion of independents in the 
sample is greater than comparable figures from previous 
surveys in the Detroit area. It is, partly understandable, 
-however, in view of the disruptive effect of the 1968 presi-. 
.dential election o n  members of the electorate who had affec- 
tive ties to political parties, but were unhappy with the 
candidate of their particular party (cf. Converse et al., 
1969). Indeed while the 1969 electorate can in no way be 
viewed as representative of the electorate in all years, it 
is especially well adapted to our purposes because of the size 
of the pool oi independents that it allows us to analyze. 
The weakening of partisan ties is not only reflected 
' in the increased proportion of independents in the electorate. 
As Table 1 shows, supporters of both parties were less likely 
. to see themselves as "strong" than as "not strong" supporters 
of their party, and independents were most likely to see' 
themselves as leaning toward neither major party. 
Far fewer of our respondents were',able to use the terms 
"liberal" and "conservative" to' define-their political posi- 
tions. Of our 640- respondents, 260 orslightly more than.40 
per cent placed thems'elves on a liberalism-conservatism' con- 
. . 
tinuum relative to each of the major .parties. AS' can be seen 
from Table 2, most respondents answering this question did 
place themselves near the middle of the spectrum; i.e., more 
conservative than the Democratic Party, more liberal than 
the Republican Party. 
.Interrelationships Among Items 
One of the questions that concerned us was.whether there 
was consensus among our respondents that the Republican Party 
was more conservative than the Democratic Party: Of our 640 
respondents, 313 compared themselves' on the liberalism-conserva- 
tism dimension with regard 'to at least one of the parties. ' Sixty- 
- three compared themselves to the ~e~ublicans. but 'not to the 
Democrats, 53 to the Democrats but not the Republicans, and 1.97, 
or about 31 per cent of the total sample, related themse-l'ves to 
both parties:. The data collected from these latter respondents , 
are presented in Table 3. . . 
The shaded area of Table 3 represents those .positions 
that are logically possible if it is assumed that the 
, , 'Republicans are more. conservative than the Democrats. 
Ninety-one per cent of the respondents appearing in 
"this table fall into these positions, indicating a high 
'level of consensus among those of our respondents who 
. . were willing.to place themselves on the liberalism- 
con'servat'ism dimension regarding the relative positions 
of the major parties. Figure 2 presents this distribution 
graphically. For the 177 people who apply the terms liberal 
and conservative consistently to'themselves and to the two 
political parties (roughly 28 per cent of our total sample) 
there is clearly not a normal distribution of political 
affect. Rather, the distribution is trimodal and would 
suggest that the parties should be bifurcating in order 
to appeal to voters at the political extremes.. Fully 55 
per cent of these voters see themselves either more con- 
servative or more liberal than both political parties. 
The forces of divergence generated by these extreme 
positions, however, are offset at least to some extent by 
the 31 per cent of this segment of the sample that sees it- 
self more conservative than the Democrats and more liberal 
than the Republicans. It is notable that only 14 per cent 
of these voters see themselves as occupying the same poli- 
tical position as either of the major parties. Presumably 
the,position that the parties occupy is a result of trying 
to appeal to constituencies on each side. 
The relationship between the party identification 
and liberalism-conservatism of our respondents is pre- 
sented in Table 4. Again, this table deals only with . , 
. . 
those respondents who rated both parties on 'the liberalism- "' 
conservatism dimension and agreed that the Republican Party 
was more conservative than the'~emocratic Party. These.data 
suggest that strong partisans tend to be more extreme in 
their polit.ica1 views than -are the parties they support, 
i.e., strong Democrats tend to be more liberal than the 
Democratic Party and strong Republicans tend'to be more 
conservative than the Republican Party. 
Weak partisans are less likely to see their political 
positions as similar to that of the parties .they choose. 
Rather, they are either more liberal or more conservative 
than their party. In thd aggregate, the leanings of weak ' . 
partisans are in a conservative direction. 'Weak.~emocrats 
are more likely to place themse.lves in the middle of the 
spectrum, and in fact .more likely to say. they are more 
conservative than both parties than they are to say they - . ' 
are more liberal than both parties. Weak Republicans are 
about' equally likely to see themselves' as more conservative. 
than both parties and occupying middle-of-the-road positions. 
Independents who express partisan leanings'similarly . '  
I;ull'the market in a conservative direction. Those who lean 
. . 
toward the Democratic.~arty tend to do so from a middle-of- 
the-road-position, and more than a third see themselves as 
more conservative than both parties. Those who lean toward 
the Republican Party are more likely to do so from'the 
. . .  
conservative than from the middle-of-the-road position. 
Finally, independents who state no preference tend to place 
themselves at the extremes, i.e., more liberal or more con- 
1 
servative than both parties. 
~ h e s e  findings indicate that the distribution of 
partisan affect is much broader than the conceptualization 
presented in Figure 1, and that the strong partisan positions '. 
do not define the poles of this distribution. Rather, there 
are independents beyond these polar positions who, rather 
. . . . 
than being "floating voters" might be" either. excluded from 
the political system or serve as the bases of support of 
. . 
-f=--WkS..q . . .  . . , .wky  mv-ts. U addition', . . , ~ W G  .. . are,:.. .. :. . . . . .. . . .  . . . 
. . 
-pendents w i t h  partisan leanings, and there are weak and 
strong partisans, who occupy market positions beyond,the . . 
perceived positions of the parties they ,support. These . . .  
factors,. based on the data presented in Table 4, serve is . , 
thecourse of the market distribution. of.the Detroit .elector- . '  . . 
ate presented in Figure ' 3. 
You will recall that respoidents were included in Table 
4 under the constraint that they placed the Republican party 
in a more conservative position than they placed the Democratic 
Party.. The entries in Figure.3 assume an additional rational 
constraint, that people choose the political'party whose 
position is compatible with their own. Thus, entries in 
'Figure . . 3 represent only those cells within'the dark lines 
of .Table 4, giving us new N of 137. These people may be .. 
t . 
regarded as ideologues in the sense that they hold aposi- 
tion on the liberalism-conservatism dimension that seems . . .  
- to determine their party choice (cf . Shapiro, 1969) . 'Parti- 
sans holding positions similar to or more extreme than the 
. . 
~pposing party are excluded (N=34). Finally it is interest- 
ing to ndte that unlike the electorate as a whole, the . - ,  
ideologues are about as likely to be Republicans as Democrats, . . . . 
. . indicating the more general tendency toward ideological con- . . 
sistency among Republicans. 
By making several assumptions regarding the market as 
defined in Figure 3 and the processes of electoral support, 
we can, compute the maximum' change in support that a party 
Can anticipate through a change in its own ideological posi- 
tion. 
Assumption 1. All voters within a partisan market who 
. . 
. . feel that they oc'cupy the same ideological'position as. their , . . . 
party will- be equally likely to vote for the party regard- 
less of the strength of -their partisan a£ fect, i .e. ,. regard- 
. . 
less of whether they are strong partisans, weak partisans, 
independents leaning toward the party, or uncommitted inde- . , 
pendents . 
Ass.umption 2. Among voters within a partisan market 
who see themselves occupying ideological positions d.ifferent',, 

the largest share of the market in the "organization" and 
"strong partisan" positions. These are.the points'on the 
. .  . 
. . .  
spectrum most likely to be associated with high turn-out 
and party support. similarly, the Republican Party stands 
to. gain by a move in either direction, and again, gains . , , 
' 
. - . . 
are maximized by .a move to a'conservative position. 
. . 
The discussion to this point was based only on those . . '  
voters whose party choices were logicallyconsistent with . .  
. . 
their ideologies. We recall from Table 4, however, that. 
a considerable proportion of potential Democratic supporters 
(particularly weak Democrats and independents with leanings .. 
toward theDemocratic Party) felt that they were' more con- 
. servative than both major parties. Although these voters. ' ' 
are off the consistent lef t-right continuum, they would 
. . 
. -.appear to accentuate pulls in a con.servative direction. on 
.. the Democratic Party. . . 
The respondents who defined their market positions 
with- regard to only one party, although few, in number, 
. should also be taken, into account. The distribution .of 
their positions is presented in   able 6 .  Interestingly, 
as these data show, .such :individua.ls were more likely to 
define their own position relative to their own party than .. 
. . 
they were, to define it relativeto the opposition party, , . 
.but the differences were not great. . , 
. ' 
.The distribution of Democratic identifiers vis-a-vis . 
the.Dem0crati.c Party was relatively flat,- with some tendency 
toward liberalism, thus exerting a potential pull on the 
party to the left. This pull is also reflected in the 
. .  . 
liberalism of. ~emocrat; who classified themselves only 
with 'regard to the Republican Party. 
. . 
'bong Repilblican identifiers, the distribution 
relative to that party was even flatter, although again 
. . 
some tendency toward liberalism was manifested. Most 
Republicans. who classified "themselves 'only. with regard 
. . 
to the Democratic Party saw 'themselves as more conserva- 
. .  . 
tive than-that party. Independents who classified,them-' 
selves with regard to only one party seem to be toward the 
middle of the spectrum, i.e., more conservative than the 
Democratic Party or more liberal than the Republican Party. 
Among these 124 respondents, those who identify with a 
' . party would probably find their:, parties more attractive 
, <. . 
- -  if they occupied more extreme market positions. The inde- 
. . 
. . 
pendents'in'this group, however, would seem to exert a 
moderating influence. 
' . One of the simplifying assumptions we have been making 
, '  to this :point is that persons of the same partisan persuasion 
. . 
will be equally likely to vote regardless of where they 
. . 
. . ....place themselves on the liberalism-conservatism dimension, 
. . other things being equal. .Particu12rly, we have assumed that 
. . 
independents who are more liberal or more conservative than 
both parties will be equally likely to .vote as middle-of-the- 
road'independents. While we have. no direct data on voting . ' 
, . 
. . turnout, we do have data on such socioeconomic variables 
as odcupation, education, and income, and we know that' . . 
voting turnout varies . . directly with occupational prestige' 
, . 
level, education, and income. We compared middle-of-the- 
road independents with liberal and-conservative independents 
. and found'no differences with regard ,to these variables. 
. . 
Insofar as we can tell, therefore, our. simplifying'assumption .. 
is. . justified. . 
Two noteworthy findings emerge from .our analysis of 
socioeconomic status. First, respondents who placed them- 
selves to the right of both parties, to the left of both 
parties, or in the.middle-of-the-road'were of higher edu- 
cational, occupational and financial. status .than were res- 
pondents who felt 'that their political position was the 
. . . . 
same as that of one of the two political'parties: 
Second, in comparing our ideologues with the rest of 
the sample, we found the former to be of consistently 
higher status. Forty-two per cent of the ideologues were 
professional, technical and managerial, while only 26 per 
cent of the rest were in these high status occupations. 
,, . ~went~-three per cent of the ideologues completed college, 
. . 
, whereas only 5 'per. cent of the non-ideological group did so. 
Seventy-seven per cent of the ideologues. had family incomes 
of $10,000 or more, as compared to 53 per. cent of the remainder. 
Given that Republicans tend to be of higher status than Demo- 
. . 
.crats, these findings are compatible with the'fact that the 
proportion-of Republicans among our ideologues is greater 

move to a politically more extreme position without certain 
knowledge that the other party will d o  1-ikewise. If the 
. . 
!Republican. Party moves in a conservative direction, for example, . .  
and the ~emocratic does not move atall, then the Democrats' 
. . 
share of the middle-of-the-road vote will increase automatically. 
The middle-of-the-road independents in fact compriseonly 2 per. 
cent of this sector of the sample. , Thebalance of the ideologi- 
calvoters are so evenly split,"however,that this "swing vote" 
. . ' .  . . iscrucial. . . 
Third, we must recognize that. political parties do not 
exist merely to accumulate as many:votes as possible. Party 
. . 
officials, and office-holders who were elected on the party 
ticket, hold certain issue positions that, in the aggregate, 
makeupthe position of the party. In seeking support for 
the party, theseof f icials must adopt a minimax decision rule. 
. . 
That is, where, necessary to 'gain the support they need, to 
translate party positions into public .policy, they will 
. . . . 
modify theirpositions. Once they have the necessary supL .' 
. . 
port, however, their commitment to their issue pos'itions .' 
prevents them from further altering these positions in order 
. . 
to' further increase support. This strategy is reflected 
. . 
in our finding that there are positions on the liberalism- 
conservatism dimension that do not seem to be represented 
. 
by our party system. Therefore, we must not focus our atten- 
tion exclusively on those voters to whom the major parties 
appeal. 
There is a contradiction between this kind of political 
-23-  
calculus and the functioning of democracy as a political 
process. Perhaps the primary function of politics and 
government is conflict resolution. The democratic pro- 
cess may be seen as one of collective bargaining, in which 
a series of interests are represented in an institutional 
arena that .can make 'value-allocative decisions. The 
various interests, in turn, regard these decisions as bind- 
ing because they have a means of making their claims within 
. / 
. . the' political structure. 
. . 
The chief, though certainly not the only linkage between 
these interests and the government are the political parties, 
which themselves must reconcile demands of several interests 
that ,at times are incompatible with each other. Where the 
range of interests is not represented by the parties (and 
this would seem to be the case in ~etroit), these interests 
will seek alternate channels into the democratic process'. 
To the extent thatthey fail to establish such ,channels or 
the governmental structure refuses to respond to their demands, 
the basis for the legitimacy that they grant to the government 
is eradicated, and, in their eyes, the established processes 
of politics come into question. Thus the political parties, 
by following.their tendencies to seek satisfactory rather 
than maximal support, may precipitate a crisis of legitimacy 
by failing to represent a broadening range of political ideas. 
Recall that in the analysis above, we have looked at only 
one plane of potential cleavage, liberalism vs. conservatism, 
and that this plane is relevant for only a minority of the 
Detroit electorate. We- believe that we must move beyond the 
simplified conception of our.politica1 system inherent in 
the traditional unidimensional approach to politics. 
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I Table 1. "Strength" :and "Leaning" of partisan' Positions. 
. . . . . 
I . . Party position I 
Indszzndent 
Strong 36 Strong 38 Republican 20 
Not Strong 64 (9 2 f:ot Strong 62 35 
45 (89) 
TOTAL 
Table 2. ~ositions'of respondents .on liberalism-conservatism relative 
to Democratic and Republican Parties (N=6,40).. 
. . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . .  
More About More Refused 
Liberal Same Conservative D.K., - N.A. To'tal 
Republican 21.7% 4.7% 14.2% 59.4% 100% 
Democrat , 11.9% 4.5% 24.2% 59.4% 100% 
. . .  . . .  . . . .  >i 
- -- 
i 
Table 3. Positions on liberalism-conservatism continuum 




, More liberal  bout same More conservative 
. :  . . 
5% More. liberal 
. ' I 
&out same ! 
More conservative, 
T a b l e  4. Political party identification, by liberalism-ccnse;.?i!:ism . . . .  . . .  ( N=171) . . . . .  . . . . . . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . 
. . . .  Strong Fie ak Xnd. 1113.. Veak Str on9 
De-m . Dem. Dem. In4. Rep - -. P E ? ~  - . T c g .  ... -.--.-- -- " ---- -.- .. - --..-- --- - 
:---> ..-L--==y=Tz==-.--..---- .- -.- . .-- z:.-~-~:::.----i.-~x-L7 1: 
Liberal 1 38 22 1 2  47 e . 7  1 7  8 q 
!I . 1, 
Democratic Party 33 3 5 Ft s 7 . - .--  - .. .- ..- . -. - ----- - .- . - . . . .  - ..- . ----- ,- .. -- . 
i ! fi 
M i d d l e  .! 1 4  4 3  46 --____ _ . -- -7 . -.-.-.C -..----- 3 ....... 
Repubxican Party 5 3.  4 1  
Table 5. Effects of an :ideological shift on Fhe distribution.' 
of support. within  artisan. markets (N=137) .* . , 
-,> 
, . 
1 Democratic Party 
. . Effect of. : 
Current Effect of conservative 
support liberal move move 
/.. . .  . . . 
organization position 7% 21%. 2 4% 
Alternative positions 
'Strong partisan 
: Weak partisan 










*!I%? 2-.-'cent independent floating vote has' been included in. 
each column. Total is. 52 + .51 - 2 = ,101% due to rounding. , 
i I Table 6. Liberalism-conservatism of respondents who 1 
I defined their political positions relative i ! t.o only one political pzrty. ($J-124)., 
C . , . . . . .  . . . . . . . . .  I  
h , I 
1 Pol-itical Position 1 -- .  - - ---. - ----- I 
i 
i 
Dem <. ---.-- Hen. - - -  Ind. --- i 
More liberal than Democratic Party 20. 
I 
I Same as Democratic Pa::ty 7.7 
1 
i More conservative than Democratic 
i Party 16 
i 
i 
1 Pure liberal than Republican .Party 30 
I 
I More conservative than Rep~?blice.n 
Party I 16 
TOTAL 100% 

Party the-road Party 
Figure 2. Distribution of r e s ~ c n 3 0 n t s  :;rho agreed that 
Rey~blFcan Party is -ore consczvative than 
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